#### Papers

Apple SEP (2)

**Confinement Types** 

- Application and analysis of the virtual machine approach to information system security and isolation
- My VM is Lighter (and Safer) than your Container

1 / 45

# Apple FaceID, TouchID, SEP


 Application Processor (AP) vs Secure Enclave Processor (SEP)

Session 08 System Isolation

Security of Information Systems (SIS)

Computer Science and Engineering Department
November 22, 2023

- Secure Enclave similar to ARM TrustZone
- hardware-based isolation
- biometrics, keys are only handled by SEP
- specific interface between AP and SEP



https://support.apple.com/en-ke/guide/security/sec59b0b31ff/web

hardware: different hardware systems, air gap

process: sandboxing, jailing

application: software fault isolation

virtual machine: isolate OSes in a single machine

3 / 45

#### Run Untrusted Code

- ▶ apps, plugins, codecs
- software not written by you, not-verified
- damage control
- kill it if it misbehaves
- ensure misbehaving app does not alter the system

6 / 45

# Software Fault Isolation

- isolate components in their fault domain
- part of the same address space
- requires some OS/hardware support to separate addresses
- Mogoşanu et al.: MicroStache: A Lightweight Execution Context for In-Process Safe Region Isolation

- mediates requests, implements policy, enforces isolation and confinement
- must always be invoked
- tamperproof
- validated

**Reference Monitor** 

8 / 45

2 / 45

4 / 45

# Reference Monitor (2)

#### Authorization Database Subject Reference Monitor Object Audit Trail https://www.researchgate.net/publication/2390175\_Secure\_Information\_Flow\_in\_Mobile\_ Bootstrapping\_Process

10 / 45

# Mechanism and Policy

- mechanism: how goals are achieved
- policy: rules that achieve isolation goals
- mechanism: mostly implementation
- policy: mostly configuration

13/45

# System Isolation

- isolate app, group apps or entire OS
- prevent it from hurting other components
- virtual machines, library OS, containers
- we consider sandboxing, mandatory access control, software fault isolation (SFI) to be app-centric mechanisms (not system-centric)

15 / 45

# Hardware Protection

- provide security isolation for shared resources
- passive components: TPM (Trusted Platform Module)
- active components: control critical system operations

#### Principles and Goals

- least privilege
- privilege separation
- safely execute a non-trusted program
- harden a system that runs programs that increase its attack surface
- isolate what can happen if a vulnerability is exploited

12 / 45

14 / 45

#### Mechanisms and Policies Aspects Dimensions Categories Physical Host Hardware Component Enforcement Location Supervisor Intra-application Mechanis Guest OS Application Group Isolation Granularity Application Security Isolation Sub-application Automatic Policy Generation Manual Reconfigurable Policy Configurability Policy Non-reconfigurable Always-on Policy Lifetime On-demand

Rui Shu et al.: A Study of Security Isolation Techniques

# Trusted Computing Base (TCB)

- trusted system components (by the reference monitor)
- critical parts of the system
- if exploited, might jeopardize the security of the entire system
- aimed to be small (reduced attack surface)

16 / 45

# Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)

- secure area on CPU
- code run is secure: confidentiality and integrity
- runs in parallel with OS

# Intel TXT



20 / 45

# ARM TrustZone

- ARM TZ
- two worlds: secure and non-secure
- rich OS runs in non-secure worlds, security-specialized code in secure world
- aim to reduce attack surface

22 / 45

24 / 45

Intel SGX

- Software Guard eXtensions
- specialized instructions
- user-level code allocates enclaves
- protected from higher privilege level components
- secure remote computation
- cache DRAM side-channel attack

https://blog.quarkslab.com/introduction-to-trusted-execution-environment-arms-trustzone.html

Normal World

Oper

Embedded OS

Cortex-A / ARM1176 Prov

Application Requiring Secure OS Support

TrustZone AP

TZ Dri

Secure World

Secure OS

Secure Elen (SecurCor

Monitor

with ARM Tr

Secure Enclave

ARM TrustZone

▶ on Apple iOS / watchOS devices


- fingerprint data completely walled from the OS
- ▶ uses a SEP (*Secure Enclave Processor*), SEP OS
- based on ARM TZ

25 / 45

# Virtual Machine

- run an isolated OS instance on top of a supervisor component (hypervisor)
- hypervisor or VMM (Virtual Machine Monitor)
- malware in a VM cannot infect host OS or other VMs

# ${\sf Virtualization}$



Rui Shu et al.: A Study of Security Isolation Techniques

21 / 45

side channels

use CPU, memory, cache information from one VM to

determine what's happening on the other  $\mathsf{V}\mathsf{M}$ 

#### VMM Detection

- VM platforms emulate simple hardware
- VMM introduces time latency variances
- VMM shares TLB (Translation Lookaside Buffers)


29 / 45 Library OS Type-1 vs Type-2

> App App App App Bins/Libs Bins/Libs **Bins/Libs** Bins/Libs LibraryOS LibraryOS LibraryOS LibraryOS Host OS Hypervisor Hardware Hardware

> > Rui Shu et al.: A Study of Security Isolation Techniques

33 / 45

30 / 45



31 / 45

# Library OS Characteristics

- unikernel
- OS functionality as user library/libraries

reduced TCB vs additional flexibility

efficiency for Type-1

- single-image app, can run on top of hypervisor or hardware
- no need for user-level/kernel-level transitions
- difficult to run multiple instances: use a hypervisor
- reduce the attack surface

Implementations


Containers

- ClickOS: virtualized software middle box
- LKL (Linux Kernel Library)
- My VM is Lighter (and Safer) than Your Container: http://cnp.neclab.eu/projects/lightvm/lightvm.pdf
- https://awesomeopensource.com/projects/unikernel

34 / 45

36 / 45


#### Unikraft



Container Container App App **Bins/Libs** Bins/Libs Docker Engine Linux Kernel Control Namespaces Groups Hardware

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# LXC/Docker



- ARM TZ
- confinementisolation
- resource monitor
- TCB
- ► TEE
- Intel TXT
- Intel SGX

container

LXC

VMM

hypervisor

library OS

unikernel

Docker

- A Study of Security Isolation Techniques
- CS155: Computer and Network Security: Isolation and Sandboxing
- https://blog.risingstack.com/ operating-system-containers-vs-application-containers/

44 / 45