
Notes Session 08 System Isolation Security of Information Systems (SIS) Computer Science and Engineering Department November 22, 2023 1 / 45 **Papers** Notes ▶ Application and analysis of the virtual machine approach to information system security and isolation ▶ My VM is Lighter (and Safer) than your Container Apple FaceID, TouchID, SEP Notes Application Processor (AP) vs Secure Enclave Processor (SEP) ► Secure Enclave - similar to ARM TrustZone ▶ hardware-based isolation biometrics, keys are only handled by SEP specific interface between AP and SEP Apple SEP (2) Notes



https://support.apple.com/en-ke/guide/security/sec59b0b31ff/web

Run Untrusted Code		Notes
 apps, plugins, codecs software not written by you, not-verified damage control kill it if it misbehaves ensure misbehaving app does not alter the system 		
	6 / 45	
Confinement Types		Notes
 hardware: different hardware systems, air gap virtual machine: isolate OSes in a single machine 		
process: sandboxing, jailingapplication: software fault isolation		
	7 / 45	
Software Fault Isolation		Notes
 isolate components in their fault domain part of the same address space requires some OS/hardware support to separate addresses 		
 Mogoșanu et al.: MicroStache: A Lightweight Execution Context for In-Process Safe Region Isolation 		
	8 / 45	
Reference Monitor		Notes
 mediates requests, implements policy, enforces isolation and confinement must always be invoked 		
➤ tamperproof		

Reference Monitor (2)

	Authorization Database	
Subject	Reference Monitor	Object
	Audit Trail	

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/2390175_Secure_Information_Flow_in_Mobile_ Bootstrapping Process

10 / 45

Principles and Goals

- ► least privilege
- privilege separation
- ▶ safely execute a non-trusted program
- harden a system that runs programs that increase its attack surface
- ▶ isolate what can happen if a vulnerability is exploited

12 / 45

Mechanism and Policy

▶ mechanism: how goals are achieved

▶ policy: rules that achieve isolation goals

▶ mechanism: mostly implementation

▶ policy: mostly configuration


Notes

Notes

Notes

13 / 45

Mechanisms and Policies




Rui Shu et al.: A Study of Security Isolation Techniques

Notes			

System Isolation		Notes
isolate app, group apps or entire OSprevent it from hurting other components		
 virtual machines, library OS, containers we consider sandboxing, mandatory access control, software 		
fault isolation (SFI) to be app-centric mechanisms (not system-centric)		
	15 / 45	
Trusted Computing Base (TCB)		
Trusted Computing Base (TCB)		Notes
trusted system components (by the reference monitor)critical parts of the system		
 if exploited, might jeopardize the security of the entire system aimed to be small (reduced attack surface) 		
	16 / 45	
Hardware Protection		Notes
 provide security isolation for shared resources passive components: TPM (<i>Trusted Platform Module</i>) 		
▶ active components: control critical system operations		
	18 / 45	
Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)		Notes
No company of CDU		
 secure area on CPU code run is secure: confidentiality and integrity runs in parallel with OS 		
· Turis in paramer with OS		

TEE (2)



https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/topic/understanding-ios-security-part-1/

20 / 45

Intel TXT

- ► Trusted eXecution Technology
- ▶ attest platform/operating system
- uses TPM and cryptography to validate/measure code that can be trusted


21 / 45

ARM TrustZone

- ► ARM TZ
- two worlds: secure and non-secure
- ► rich OS runs in non-secure worlds, security-specialized code in secure world
- ▶ aim to reduce attack surface

22 / 45

ARM TrustZone



https://blog.quarkslab.com/introduction-to-trusted-execution-environment-arms-trustzone.html

Ν	lot	tes	

Notes	
Notes	
Notes	
TVOLES	

- ► Software Guard eXtensions
- specialized instructions
- ► user-level code allocates enclaves
- protected from higher privilege level components
- secure remote computation
- ► cache DRAM side-channel attack


24 / 45

Secure Enclave

- ► on Apple iOS / watchOS devices
- ▶ fingerprint data completely walled from the OS
- ▶ uses a SEP (Secure Enclave Processor), SEP OS
- ▶ based on ARM TZ

25 / 45

Virtualization



Rui Shu et al.: A Study of Security Isolation Techniques

27 / 45

Virtual Machine

- ► run an isolated OS instance on top of a supervisor component (hypervisor)
- ▶ hypervisor or VMM (Virtual Machine Monitor)
- ▶ malware in a VM cannot infect host OS or other VMs

Notes

Notes

Notes

Notes

Covert Channels		Notes
► side channels		
use CPU, memory, cache information from one VM to		
determine what's happening on the other VM		
	29 / 45	
VMM Detection		
		Notes
► VM platforms emulate simple hardware		
VMM introduces time latency variances		
► VMM shares TLB (<i>Translation Lookaside Buffers</i>)		
	30 / 45	
Type-1 vs Type-2		
31		Notes
► reduced TCB vs additional flexibility		
 efficiency for Type-1 		
	31 / 45	
Library OS		N
		Notes
App App App App		
Bins/Libs Bins/Libs Bins/Libs		
LibraryOS LibraryOS LibraryOS		
Host OS Hypervisor		
Hardware Hardware		
(a) LibraryOS on Host OS (b) LibraryOS on Hypervisor		
(a) Library OS On Flost OS (b) Library OS On Hypervisor		

Library OS Characteristics

- unikernel
- ► OS functionality as user library/libraries
- ▶ single-image app, can run on top of hypervisor or hardware
- ▶ no need for user-level/kernel-level transitions
- ▶ difficult to run multiple instances: use a hypervisor
- ► reduce the attack surface


34 / 45

Implementations

- ► ClickOS: virtualized software middle box
- ► LKL (Linux Kernel Library)
- My VM is Lighter (and Safer) than Your Container: http://cnp.neclab.eu/projects/lightvm/lightvm.pdf
- ▶ https://awesomeopensource.com/projects/unikernel

35 / 45


Unikraft



https://unikraft.org/docs/concepts/build-process/

36 / 45

Containers



Rui Shu et al.: A Study of Security Isolation Techniques

N	otes	
---	------	--

Notes

Notes

Notes

Container		Notes
restricted environmentapplications or application groups		
sandboxing only provides a certain set of privilegescontainers provide a dedicated isolated environment		
	39 / 45	
LXC/Docker		Notes
 Linux Containers use Linux namespaces: PID, network, IPC, mount, user, UTS 		
 Linux control groups (cgroups): limits, accounts, isolates resource usage 		
	40 / 45	
OS vs. Application Containers		Notes
		Notes
 OS: provided an entire distro, similar to a virtual machine (LXC) 		
 app: provide an environment for running a single service (Docker) 		
	41 / 45	
Containers vs. hypervisors		
,,		Notes
containers are faster to create, deploy, run		
containers are lighter (reduced overhead)hypervisors are more secure: reduced TCB, no common kernel	I	

► ARM TZ ► confinement ► VMM ▶ isolation hypervisor resource monitor ► library OS ► TCB unikernel ► TEE container ► Intel TXT ► LXC ► Intel SGX Docker 44 / 45 Resources Notes ► A Study of Security Isolation Techniques ► CS155: Computer and Network Security: Isolation and ${\sf Sandboxing}$ ▶ https://blog.risingstack.com/ ${\tt operating-system-containers-vs-application-containers}/$ 45 / 45 Notes Notes

Notes

Keywords