Notes

### Session 05 Defense and Mitigation

### B cronoc and mangation

### Security of Information Systems (SIS)

Computer Science and Engineering Department

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1 / 49

### Attack and Defense

► attack: exploit vulnerabilities

- defense: prevent attacks, make attacks difficult, confine attacks
- attacker needs to find one security hole
- defender has to protect all security holes
- attacker invests time
- defense mechanisms incur overhead

2 / 49

Papers

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- Mitigating Program Security Vulnerabilities: Approaches and Challenges
- Securing Web Application Code by Static Analysis and Runtime Protection

3 / 49

### Attacker Goals

- control
- cripple
- steal

- determine entries/input
- graph/automaton describes system/application behavior
- subvert graph

  - add new nodes (inject)
    add new edges
    use existing paths in a different way

6 / 49

7 / 49

9 / 49

Attack Vector

chain together multiple exploits

- ► gain access, gain privileged access, cripple, steal
- use vulnerabilities in software, system, web

Time

- ► always on the attacker side
- prevent attacks is better than handling attacks

System Components

protect everything

> attacker need only find one flaw

defense in depth

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Notes

- preventive/proactive is better than reactive
- harden system components
- monitor everything

11 / 49

12 / 49

Security vs Speed

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- ▶ any defense mechanism incurs overhead
- use both offline (check at development time) and online mechanisms (check/harden during run-time)

### Handling Complexity

- automate processes
- verification and validation
- check before deployment
- prioritize critical parts

13 / 49

### Monitoring

- paranoia is a virtue
- frequent updates
- be on the lookout for CVEs

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- prevent existence and prevent exploitation
- during development
- before deployment
- during deployment: prevent, react, confine

16 / 49

### **Prevent Existence**

prevent existence of bugs and vulnerabilities

- during development and before deployment
- Secure Software Development
- secure coding, defensive programming
- code auditing, code linting
- fuzzing, symbolic execution

17 / 49

### Prevent Exploitation

- during deployment
- ▶ if vulnerabilities exist, you cannot exploit them
- either prevent or make it harder for the attacker
- harden the application, the system

18 / 49

### Making Exploitation it Harder

- randomize
- obfuscate
- break application into multiple apps
- reduce number of inputs (attack surface)

### Notes

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### make memory areas inaccessible

- isolate components
- harden executable with checker and sanitizers during runtime
- disadvantage: incurs overhead

20 / 49

### Confine

▶ more in session 7: Application Confinement

- when the attack happens, reduce damage
- sandboxing, permissions
- treat application as potential malware

21 / 49

React

- monitor applications, system
- when attack happens, document, make app/system inaccessible
- patch as soon as possible
- investigate, prevent future similar attacks

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22 / 49

- ▶ application is target of attacker
- input minimization, input validation
- $\blacktriangleright\,$  you deploy an app that may have flaws or may be malware
- memory disclosure attacks, application control

- prevent control flow hijacking
- prevent memory/information disclosure
- be on the look for policy flaws that may allow the app to leak information

25 / 49

CFI

Notes

- Control Flow Integrity
- make sure control flow graph is unchanged during run
- high overhead
- ▶ fine-grained vs coarse grained CFI

26 / 49

**Code Pointers** 

- critical memory data
- target for attacker for control flow hijacking
- function return addresses, function pointers
- ► Code Pointer Integrity (faster approache to CFI), next lecture

27 / 49

# Prevent Vulnerabilities vs Prevent Exploiting vs Make Unlikely vs Confine

- prevent vulnerabilities: secure coding, verification, fuzzing, symbolic execution, type safety, safe programming languages (later sessions)
- prevent exploiting: ASan, StackGuard (canaries), SafeStack, CFI, input validation, DEP
- make unlikely: ASLR, multiple heaps
- confine: sandboxing, privacy settings, access control settings, SFI (Software Fault Isolation) (later sessions)

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### Stack Guard / Address Sanitizer

### stack canary, stack protector

- added at compile time
- value (canary) placed between buffer and return address
- overwriting canary is detected and ends the program
- may leak canary and overwrite it with itself
- may overwrite other data (without overwriting canary)
- may overwrite stack guard exit handler
- Google Address Sanitizer adds multiple checks, albeit at increased overhead

29 / 49

Notes

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Notes

### Input Validation

- assume input is "evil"
- prevent injection: command injection, SQL injection, shellcode injection
- prevent attacks such as billion laughs attacks
- prevent certain patterns, parse input

30 / 49

CFI

- monitor control graph
- monitor calls, jumps, branches
- aim to do it without incurring significant overhead
- may happen offline

31 / 49

SafeStack

### Notes

store code pointers in a separate stack

- buffer overflows will not overflow code pointers
- provide specific methods to access safe stack data

- Data Execution Prevention
- mark writable memory area as non-executable
- ▶ you cannot write and execute, i.e. inject code
- data, heap, stack are marked with DEP
- may be bypassed by using a mprotect()-like call to update memory area permissions

33 / 49

### ASLR

Notes

- Address Space Layout Randomization
- new memory sections (especially libraries) are loaded at random addresses
- makes it difficult to find addresses
- not that effective on i386; useful on x86\_64
- may be bypassed by information leaking

34 / 49

General

- secure configuration
- input sanitization
- trusted connection
- no vulnerable dependencies

Verification

client side

server side

### Notes

36 / 49

- ► HTTPS, SSL/TLS
- certificate
- downgrade attacks

38 / 49

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### Secure HTTP Headers

- HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS)
- ► X-Frame-Options
- ► X-XSS-Protection
- X-Content-Type-Options
- Content-Security-Policy
- Referrer-Policy
- Expect-CT

39 / 49

### Database protection

- ► sanitize queries
- encrypt data at rest
- encrypt data in transit
- sanitize queries

40 / 49

### General System Defense

- - Intrusion Detection System
  - Intrusion Prevention System

- secure boot
- application signing

43 / 49

Notes

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Notes

### Sandboxing

Mandatory Access Control

- SELinuxSMACK
- AppArmorTOMOYO
- seccomp

44 / 49

Kernel Config

### ► CONFIG\_HARDENED\_USERCOPY

- ► CONFIG\_FORTIFY\_SOURCE
- CONFIG\_RANDOMIZE\_BASE (KASLR)
- ► CONFIG\_KASAN
- CONFIG\_UBSAN
- In development
  - KTSANKMSAN
- grsecurity

45 / 49

### Defensive Mechanisms

prevent existence, prevent exploitation

- development, before deployment, during deployment
- ▶ input is the root of all evil
- look out for control flow hijacks, information leaks, malformed input

- vulnerability
- exploit
- attack vector
- prevention
- isolation
- CFI
- code pointerStack Guard
- ASLRAddress Sanitizer

DEP

- downgrade attacks
- secure HTTP headers
- sandboxing
  - Mandatory Access Control

48 / 49

Resources

Let's Encrypt

- Defeating SSL Using Sslstrip
- OWASP Secure Headers Project

49 / 49

Notes

Notes