



# Lecture 6

## Exploit Protection Mechanisms

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Computer and Network Security  
November 07, 2022

Computer Science and Engineering Department

Exploiting: Recap

Preventing Existence

Preventing Exploitation

Summary

- ▶ money
- ▶ fame
- ▶ money
- ▶ challenge
- ▶ money
- ▶ politics
- ▶ fun
- ▶ career

- ▶ penetration testing
- ▶ security consulting
- ▶ security auditing
- ▶ prepare for defense
- ▶ knowledge base

- ▶ gain control (root access)
- ▶ leak information (privacy leaks, passwords)
- ▶ cripple infrastructure (denial of service, shut down)

- ▶ exploit applications while running
- ▶ alter application behavior
- ▶ exploiting vulnerabilities and misconfigurations
- ▶ focus is controlling the system (root account)
- ▶ an intermediary step is gaining shell access to user
- ▶ privilege escalation

- ▶ goal is alter the application control flow
- ▶ either use existing functionality (in some new way) or inject new functionality
- ▶ rewrite/rewire configuration/code to create a new execution path
- ▶ it starts with a buffer overflow and an overwrite of data

- ▶ buffer overflow overwrites a code pointer
- ▶ find a suitable address to point new code pointer to
- ▶ execute new path
- ▶ code pointer may be: return address (on stack), function pointer



- ▶ write beyond buffer limits
- ▶ stack-based overflow: overwrite variable, return address or function pointer
- ▶ heap overflow: corrupt dynamically allocated memory

- ▶ sequence of machine level instructions
- ▶ stored in memory at a convenient address
- ▶ executed when requested by jumping at the start address

- ▶ place shellcode in local buffer on stack
- ▶ rewrite return address to point to beginning of the buffer on the stack
- ▶ may need NOPs if exact address is not known
- ▶ unable to be done if stack is non-executable

- ▶ find vulnerability: buffer overflow
- ▶ determine offset from buffer to code pointer
- ▶ determine address of buffer storing the shellcode
- ▶ build shellcode
- ▶ create payload: injected shellcode + padding + return address overwrite in payload
- ▶ trigger attack: send data as argument, standard input or environment variable; jump to shellcode address
- ▶ attack is executed by executing shellcode

- ▶ (from Jonathan Katz, CMSC 414, Computer and Network Security)
- ▶ prevent existence
  - ▶ safe programming/secure coding
  - ▶ input validation
  - ▶ static/dynamic analysis
- ▶ prevent exploitation
  - ▶ ASCII armored address space
  - ▶ stack guard/stack protection
  - ▶ non executable stack/data execution prevention
  - ▶ address space layout randomization (ASLR)

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Summary

- ▶ string management
- ▶ integer management
- ▶ buffer management
- ▶ bounds checking
- ▶ safe typing, data conversions
- ▶ code auditing
- ▶ ...

- ▶ sanitizing input
- ▶ all are printable characters in case of string functions
- ▶ proper data type, proper sign
- ▶ may incur overhead



- ▶ analyze source code without running the program
- ▶ coverity, cppcheck, splint, clang static analyzer
- ▶ may also be done on binary files: Veracode, CodeSonar

- ▶ run program and find vulnerabilities
- ▶ fuzz testing: send random data as input
- ▶ slows program, may find more problems
- ▶ valgrind, purify, dmalloc

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Summary

- ▶ code integrity protection
- ▶ randomize address space
- ▶ stack guard

- ▶ place code, data and libraries at addresses starting with 0x00
- ▶ disables attacks that require the NUL byte to be absent
- ▶ certain attacks may work even if the NUL byte is present

- ▶ do not modify code, do not execute writable zone
- ▶ stack and other zones of memory that are writable are marked non-executable
- ▶ any jump to the stack or heap would result in access violation

- ▶ page/segment is either writable or executable

- ▶ page is marked as non-executable
- ▶ CPU bit, set by OS
- ▶ may be bypassed using `mprotect()`



- ▶ jump to existing executable code
- ▶ return-to-libc (call system)
- ▶ use return oriented programming
- ▶ for testing purposes, disable using `-z execstack` as argument to `ld`
- ▶ use `mprotect` to update page permissions

- ▶ `call system("/bin/sh")`
- ▶ use `mprotect()` to force writable executable stack

- ▶ randomize address space, place code, libraries and stack and random addresses
- ▶ a buffer will use a different address each time the program is run

- ▶ Position Independent Code (in libraries)
- ▶ Position Independent Executable (in executable files)

- ▶ brute forcing (32 bit systems)
- ▶ use format string or other vulnerabilities to learn stack layout
- ▶ use huge NOP sled
- ▶ bug: use `ulimit -s unlimited` – the stack fills all available space
- ▶ for testing purposes, you may disable it

#### Disable ASLR

```
echo 0 | sudo tee /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space  
setarch $(uname -m) -R /bin/bash
```

- ▶ use brute force to bypass ASLR

- ▶ place a value between buffer and frame pointer/return value
- ▶ canary value
- ▶ in case of buffer overflow, value gets written and an exception handler is run

- ▶ may contain terminator characters (0x00, 0x0a, 0x0d, 0xff)
- ▶ may be a random string or a XOR function



▶ demo

- ▶ does not protect internal variables or buffer from another buffer
- ▶ you may use string formatting attacks to find the canary value and rewrite with itself
- ▶ in case the process forks, you may trigger multiple forks and then try guessing one byte at a time
- ▶ for test purposes, disable using `-fno-stack-protector` as argument to gcc

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- ▶ ASCII-armored address spaces
- ▶ code integrity protection, data execution prevention
- ▶ address space layout randomization
- ▶ stack protection/stack guard, canary value

- ▶ code reuse
  - ▶ return to libc
  - ▶ return oriented programming
- ▶ data oriented attacks: do not target the alteration of the control flow, but overwrite data

- ▶ exploit
- ▶ buffer overflow
- ▶ shellcode
- ▶ input validation
- ▶ static analysis
- ▶ dynamic analysis
- ▶ code integrity
- ▶ DEP
- ▶ ASLR
- ▶ PIC, PIE
- ▶ canary value
- ▶ stack guard

- ▶ The Art of Exploitation, 2nd Edition
  - ▶ Chapter 0x600. Countermeasures

- ▶ <http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/20497/stack-overflows-defeating-canaries-aslr-dep-nx>
- ▶ <http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/18556/how-do-aslr-and-dep-work>
- ▶ <http://www.phrack.org/issues.html?id=13&issue=67&mode=txt>
- ▶ <http://www.cs.umd.edu/~jkatz/security/s12/lecture22.ppt>
- ▶ <http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~covam/teaching/2012/secprog/10-more-defenses.pdf>